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blaber
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xx The identity of indiscernibles
« Thread started on: Nov 9th, 2005, 10:58am »

Hi,

did Leibniz himself ever reply or react to objections to the identity of indiscernibles? In particular to objections or counter examples of the following sort.

In a universe that consist of two identical spheres, both have exactly the same properties but are not the same.
Or if the universe consists of two symetrical parts, then every object has a counter part with exactly the same properties. They are however not identical. Not at least in the ontological sense of being the same object. So one could argue that principle is false if it was meant as an ontological principle.



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Appetitio
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xx Re: The identity of indiscernibles
« Reply #1 on: Nov 10th, 2005, 08:57am »

on Nov 9th, 2005, 10:58am, Guest-blaber wrote:
Hi,

did Leibniz himself ever reply or react to objections to the identity of indiscernibles? In particular to objections or counter examples of the following sort.

In a universe that consist of two identical spheres, both have exactly the same properties but are not the same.
Or if the universe consists of two symetrical parts, then every object has a counter part with exactly the same properties. They are however not identical. Not at least in the ontological sense of being the same object. So one could argue that principle is false if it was meant as an ontological principle.





Guess you are already familiar with Leibniz 5th letter to Clarke, section 21-25?
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blaber
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xx Re: The identity of indiscernibles
« Reply #2 on: Nov 10th, 2005, 12:14pm »

on Nov 10th, 2005, 08:57am, Markku Roinila wrote:
Guess you are already familiar with Leibniz 5th letter to Clarke, section 21-25?


No.

Found some piceces on the web. And they seem really intressting. Thanks.
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xx Re: The identity of indiscernibles
« Reply #3 on: Nov 10th, 2005, 1:13pm »

on Nov 10th, 2005, 12:14pm, Guest-blaber wrote:
No.

Found some piceces on the web. And they seem really intressting. Thanks.


Good. Let us know if you find any defence...at first sight, the piece in the letter to Clarke does not feature any...
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Nihil sine ratione.
Amras
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xx Re: The identity of indiscernibles
« Reply #4 on: Dec 19th, 2007, 08:57am »

I think there could be an argument which can be called "semantic a priori argument". It goes as follows:
Leibniz claim is that there are no two things in the world which are identical. That means there are distinct. To use the notion distinction we already have to presuppose it. Otherwise we could not distinct this sentences. Therefore the principium identitatis indiscernibilium is necessary to speak.

I know that this is not an ontological argument but I see no chance to proof it for the simple substances, the monads directly. Only over the way how we speak about them.
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theoko
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xx Re: The identity of indiscernibles
« Reply #5 on: May 23rd, 2008, 6:01pm »

on Nov 9th, 2005, 10:58am, Guest-blaber wrote:
Hi,

did Leibniz himself ever reply or react to objections to the identity of indiscernibles? In particular to objections or counter examples of the following sort.

In a universe that consist of two identical spheres, both have exactly the same properties but are not the same.
Or if the universe consists of two symetrical parts, then every object has a counter part with exactly the same properties. They are however not identical. Not at least in the ontological sense of being the same object. So one could argue that principle is false if it was meant as an ontological principle.


I'm not aware of Leibniz providing a sustained defense of IoI, but since he wrote so very much it is possible that he did.

The challenge to it that you provide sounds a lot like a paper Max Black wrote called "The Identity of Indiscernables" which appeared in Mind magazine. I believe Black's paper was written in the 1970's and I don't know if it was an entirely new argument against IoI or a rehashing of an old one. I took Black's paper as an argument FOR "bare particulars" and IoI as an argument against them.

If I remember correctly- and I'm not all certain of this- Albert Casullo rebuts much of Black's paper in his "Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory", but I have to confess that I may have Casullo's paper mixed up with an entirely different one.
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